Labor Unions, Race and the Changing Face of the Post War Democratic Party by Koch, Walter
University of Colorado, Boulder
CU Scholar
Undergraduate Honors Theses Honors Program
Spring 2016
Labor Unions, Race and the Changing Face of the
Post War Democratic Party
Walter Koch
walter.koch@colorado.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholar.colorado.edu/honr_theses
Part of the American Politics Commons, and the Models and Methods Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Honors Program at CU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors
Theses by an authorized administrator of CU Scholar. For more information, please contact cuscholaradmin@colorado.edu.
Recommended Citation
Koch, Walter, "Labor Unions, Race and the Changing Face of the Post War Democratic Party" (2016). Undergraduate Honors Theses.
Paper 1160.
1 
 
  Labor Unions, Race and the Changing Face 
of the Post War Democratic Party 
By Walter Koch: 
Political Science Departmental Honors Thesis 
University of Colorado Boulder, Walter.Koch@Colorado.edu 
Thesis Advisor 
 Kenneth Bickers: Department of Political Science 
Defence Committee Members 
Janet Donavan: Department of Political Science  
                  Thomas Zeiler: Department of History/ Director, Program in 
International Affairs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
Walter Koch: Labor Unions, Race and the Changing Face of the Post War Democratic 
Party 
Under the Direction of Kenneth Bickers 
Over the past half century America’s two party system has undergone significant 
geographic, ideological and demographic shifts. The Democratic Party that once had 
a strong support base of working class whites and southerners, has now become a 
party comprised of mostly progressives and racial minorities. I expected that the 
decline of private sector unions over the past fifty years was contributing to a 
pattern of working class whites abandoning the contemporary Democratic Party. 
Moreover I expected the fall in labor membership numbers along with a rise in white 
collar unions at the expense of traditional manufacturing organizations, to affect the 
ability of labor leaders to politically mobilize members in the same successful manner 
that characterized much of the mid 20th century. In testing these expectations I 
gathered ANES survey data from the 1960 and 2008 election cycles and created a 
number of variables that would paint a picture of the electoral environment in both 
years. What I found was that racial polarization between the two parties had 
replaced the traditional class divisions that had existed for over a century. Across the 
country, the binding relationship that once existed between working voters and the 
Democratic Party had disappeared. The splintering of the working class vote has 
been compounded by consistently low voter turnout among poorly educated 
individuals relative to individuals with a college background. This paper reveals the 
increased political isolation of working class voters and the emergence of a highly 
racially polarized two party system. 
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Question:  How has the decline of American labor unions influenced turnout and 
the racial basis of Democratic affiliation in the post war era? 
Introduction: The Factional Battles of 1968 
Throughout the past half century the Democratic Party has seen a 
fundamental transformation in both its geographic and demographic support bases. 
The gradual relinquishment of the party’s stronghold in the south along with a 
renewed focus on capturing emerging demographic groups, has altered both the 
profile of a Democratic voter as well as the candidates the party is nominating for 
high office. During the 1968 Democratic National Convention, a cleavage emerged 
between the party’s traditional working class, labor faction and the new progressive 
wing of the party. In a rare moment in the party’s history, the emerging factions 
fueled by the civil rights movement and dissenting views on the Vietnam War, 
confronted powerful party bosses like Mayor Richard Daley and union leaders who 
had held a stranglehold on the party. The chaotic and polarizing nature of the event 
embarrassed the party and ignited a factional battle for the ideological heart of 
America’s left wing. Today, evidence suggests that progressives have won this battle 
(Teixeira and Judis 2004: 42). 
 A voter coalition comprising of minority groups, young people and 
progressives have successfully won national elections despite seeing minimal support 
from white voters (39% in 2012). The once powerful and reliable Democratic base 
that was made up of blue-collar, ehtnically diverse but racially white union members 
has seemingly taken a back seat to a majority coalition that has delivered 
consecutive presidential victories (Teixeira and Judis 2004: 27). While Democratic 
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leaders have been buoyed by these results, the dramatic decline in the white vote 
will have significant consequences. This paper explores the reason for this decline 
placing focus on the effects that falling union membership has had on both white 
general election turnout and white Democratic affiliation during these election 
cycles.  
Labor Unions and the Democratic Party: The New Deal Coalition 
For over a century labor unions have been extremely effective in mobilizing 
their members to play a significant role within the electorate. Traditionally, labor 
unions have been closely aligned with the Democratic Party, with labor organizations 
supporting a Democratic platform that protects workers rights to organize and places 
emphasis on a strong economic safety. During the late 1930s, unions were on the 
frontlines in crafting many of President Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal Era policies. 
These policies provided long awaited social and economic safety nets for previously 
vulnerable workers, while also establishing a legal framework that made organizing 
much less difficult in highly industrialized regions of the country. The passage of 
National Labor Relations Act in 1935 emboldened workers by granting federal 
sanctions to union contracts and led to the creation of the National Labor Relations 
Board that enforced collective bargaining rights in the private sector (Zelizer 2004). 
This decade seemingly sealed the relationship between unions and their political 
allies within the Democratic Party. “Unions were not simply useful allies; their basic 
goals embodied the basic goals of the Democratic Party after FDR.” (Zelizer 2004). 
An era commenced in which the Democratic Party and the Labor movement became 
symbiotic. In exchange for rallying it’s members to show up at the polls as well as 
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engaging in large fundraising operations, union leaders were able to lobby left 
leaning law makers to pursue a liberal policy agenda that would suit the needs of 
their members (Zelizer 2004). These policies were particularly instrumental in 
creating union hotbeds within urban areas of the Midwest and Northeast. While the 
labor movement had carved a clear political faction within the party, union leaders 
were paramount in achieving other progressive goals. Leaders like Walter Reuther 
former President of the United Automobile Workers and Phillip Randolf of the AFL-
CIO were outspoken campaigners for the civil rights movement, partnering with 
Martin Luther King Junior in organizing the 1963 march on Washington (AFL-CIO). 
While this serves as an example of two factions within the party coming together, 
conflict would soon emerge between the labor dominated wing of the party and 
other progressive factions that held different political and ideological goals. 
Labor Union Voter Mobilization: The Awakening of a Political Force 
 It is well documented that unions have successfully engaged in voter 
mobilization efforts for decades. It was in the mid 1930s when unions began to 
show their political clout by using the full force of organizations to change the 
electoral landscape. This surge in political influence came on the back of a massive 
movement towards organized labor in the wake of the Great Depression. Prior to the 
Depression in 1930, just 10% of the non-agricultural workforce was organized 
(Plotke 1996: 145). Along with little influence in the workforce labor had no 
organization within the political system, as leaders were often split between the two 
parties. It was reported that in the early 1930s many prominent members of AFL 
leadership and rank and file members were openly Republican (Plotke 1996: 147). 
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With the growth of organized labor within industrial regions of the country union 
leaders knew that they would need consistent political representation to achieve 
their economic objectives in an era when the labor movement’s future remained 
fragile. At this stage the incentive driving union leaders into the political arena was 
the possibility of influencing legislation that would foster an environment where 
unions could survive. As David Plotke explains “The Labor movement needed a pro-
union political outcome. To obtain that political outcome labor had to build a viable 
political force, as there was no predefined labor vote that could be signaled.” (1996: 
154) Labor’s need for representation led them to contribute $750,000 to President 
Franklin Roosevelt’s reelection campaign in 1936. This was a significant move as it 
showed the union movement’s commitment to the Democratic Party in the depth of 
the Great of Depression when fundraising from more prominent factions within the 
party were difficult to come by (Plotke 1996: 156). Due to the radical elements 
within the union movement many party elites viewed this emerging force with 
suspicion. Members with labor ties were initially denied any significant role within 
the party and during the 1936 convention “The labor division of the party’s 
campaign committee was small, poorly funded and caught up in labor’s factional 
conflicts” (Plotke 1996: 158). 
The union movement would successfully find a foothold within the party by 
dominating local politics in urban areas. By setting up labor led party organizing in a 
number of cities like Minneapolis and New York, union leaders could channel 
information from the party to its members and educate previously disenfranchised 
voting groups. This hierarchal structure also allowed members to air their grievances 
to union officials who would then pass the information to labor factions within the 
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party who had far reaching influence even at the executive level. As Plotke explains 
“The political power of the labor movement grew as the state expanded through the 
New Deal” (1996: 155). This meant that labor was able to grow with the increased 
role of government in the economy.  
In the early stages of union involvement in the electoral arena the difficult 
task in mobilizing this massive voting bloc would reside in combating the collective 
action issues that could hamper the political influence of any interest group. It was 
also a difficult task to convince members who joined a union for economic reasons 
to become educated and participate in the political aspects of the labor movement. 
Herbert Asher in his book titled American Labor Unions in the Political Arena 
suggests that the solidarity developed over time amongst workers supporting each 
other in the fight for workplace rights was converted into political unity, held by 
members across the country (Asher 2001:111). A shared political identity, developed 
through a shared struggle helped create a faction of voters that could sway an 
election. In order to mobilize this large swath of voters unions developed a tradition 
of face to face voter contact. Asher quotes one Ohio AFL leader in saying “ You don’t 
get participation from putting a flyer on the bulletin board. You get it from going 
nose to nose, toe-to toe, asking people. That’s what works” (2001:113).  This kind 
of physical voter contact from leaders to members enabled the union movement to 
grow into a strong united force within American politics. 
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Modern Day Mobilization 
While campaigns and elections have changed drastically since labor’s 
entrance into the political frame in the 1930s, unions still have the ability to 
effectively mobilize their members to turn out in big numbers on Election Day. One 
contemporary study notes that union members are just over twelve-percentage 
points more likely to vote than non-union members (Mcelwee 2015). These far 
reaching mobilization efforts not only target individual members but also voters who 
live in a community with a significant labor presence. During the 2014-midterm 
elections (an election cycle with incredibly low turnout) a study cited by Sean 
Mcelwee of the The American Prospect found that 39% of non-union workers turned 
out while 52% of union workers were present at the polls (Mcelwee 2015). 
According to Mcelwee labors inherent ability to turn out blue collar workers leads to 
a reduction in the predetermined class bias of voter turnout that exists throughout 
the American electorate (Mcelwee: 2015). Unions will provide resources and 
information that enhance the political knowledge of their members. A homogonous, 
educated and highly mobilized working class vote is an imporant factor in creating 
strong political reprsentation for workers. In 2000 the AFL-CIO reported that they 
had made over 8 million phone calls and distributed roughly 14 million flyers to their 
members once a week from September until election day. Perhaps most importantly 
the AFL-CIO donated $43 million in a specific drive to increase turnout among 
members and their families (Freeman 2003:1). Recently, many of these mobilization 
efforts involve taking advantage of technology that was not previously available. 
Targeting voters using data driven tools has enabled unions to improve their ability 
to reach their members (Freeman 2003:4). 
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A separate 2006 study by political scientists Jonathan Nagler and Jan Leighley 
looked at the type of individuals that are targeted by these voter mobilization 
efforts. They find that “The decline in union membership since 1964 has affected the 
aggregate turnout of both low and middle-income individuals more than the 
aggregate turnout of both low and middle income of high income individual” (2006: 
14). Findings such as these reinforce the notion that labor unions provide political 
representation to people who are among the most politically isolated members of 
society. The significant fall in the rate of national unionization (29% in 1964 to 13% 
in 2006 according to Nagler and Leighley) may have consequences regarding the 
participation of low-income individuals in the political process. Moreover, Nagler and 
Leighley explain that unions provide information to candidates of their preference on 
the conditions of their electorate so that campaigns can more effectively micro 
target voters (2006: 17). This coordination is vital as campaigns are able to craft a 
policy message that resonates with a particular group of voters and increase the 
likelihood that they will turnout. 
 Studies have shown that unions have also been successful in mobilizing non-
members who hold pro-union sentiments (Freeman 2003: 12). This may include 
progressives who support a liberal agenda and live in an area of high union density. 
A grassroots mobilization effort would include and perhaps successfully influence 
these non-members to vote. Alternatively, Master and Delaney claim that turnout 
data measured against union concentration can paint a false picture. While this 
paper focuses on presidential politics, unions will spend more money and provide 
more resources in races that are considered to be close (Kaufman; Bennet 2011: 
504). Moreover business groups like the chamber of commerce will combat these 
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mobilization efforts by also devoting resources to close races. This may mean that 
data measuring a city’s unionization level against the level of union led mobilization, 
may be skewed as unions are forced to spend more and increase grass roots 
activities in tight election contests. As will be discussed later on, the changing 
demography of unions, in particular the increased racial diversity may have a 
significant impact on the ability for that union to mobilize its members politically. As 
Asher explains “Mobilizing of a homogenous group of union members with similar 
demographics is one thing. But how do union leaders mobilize members who differ 
so much from one another, especially if the demographic heterogeneity is indicative 
to heterogeneity with regards to political attitudes, and goals” (2001: 39). This 
remains the primary issue that unions will have to grapple with when it comes to 
mobilizing in a contemporary setting. 
Private Sector Union Decline and Demographic Changes 
Over time a number of naturally occurring and policy driven factors have 
contributed to a sharp decline in unionization across the country. In 1947 southern 
Democrats feared that increasingly integrated unions would accelerate the 
dismantling of Jim Crow laws. What followed was the passage of the 1947 Taft 
Hartley Act that allowed states to pass Right to Work legislation (Zelizer 2004).  This 
began an incrementall rise of Right To Work legislation (state law that prohibits 
unions from mandating compulsory employee membership) particularly in southern 
states. In combination with industrial relations reforms like the Landrum Griffith Act 
of 1957 (a law that forced unions to count non-member votes in union elections), 
the labor movement slowly became more legally constrained (Barbash 1958:14). 
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While many states particularly in the northeast and Midwest enjoyed consistently 
high membership rates through the 1970s, southern states, that virtually all had 
adopted Right To Work legislation by 1978, were able to lure industrialists away 
from more heavily organized states (Zelizer 2004). Economic globalization has also 
played a major role in the declining membership base of unions across the country. 
Manufacturing jobs that once were the lifeblood of the labor movement have been 
squeezed out of an increasingly modernized economy. The loss of these traditionally 
heavily unionized, blue-collar jobs at the expense of emerging high-tech service 
sector positions has accelerated this process.   
While the rate of private sector unionization has fallen, public sector union 
membership has remained steady and at times grown. In 2014, 35.7% of public 
sector employees were members of a union while the rate of private sector 
membership was almost five times lower at 6.6% (Freeman 2005:15). In 1983, 
three in ten union members worked in manufacturing, in 2008 that number was 
down to one in ten (Freeman 2005: 4). This has come at the benefit of public sector 
organizations like police, fire and teachers unions. Demographic changes within 
labor unions have also fundamentally changed the way in which they operate 
politically. The rise of white collar unions have shifted the profile of an individual 
union member. An increase in high-tech jobs has largely fueled this trend where five 
in ten of the biggest unions are composed of “Professionals such as educators, 
governments or service workers” (Asher 2001:30). This has resulted in a falling 
number of the blue collar manufacturing members that have become such a 
hallmark of the labor movement throughout the 20th century. These white collar 
workers are generally well paid, better educated and less loyal to their union, 
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compared to their industrial counterparts (Asher 2001:33). They also have 
increasingly become dominated by women. In 1998, women represented 44% of all 
unionized workers. Of that 44% over three quarters worked in white collar industries 
(Asher 2001: 30).  Women are set to become the majority of unionized workers by 
2020 (Freeman 2005:7). 
The other notable trend in the changing dynamics of labor unions is the 
increase in racial diversity amongst members. According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, in 1952 white American’s made up close to 90% of union membership. In 
2015, African American’s are now more likely to be in a union than whites (Bureau 
of Labor Statistics: Union Members Summary). Hispanics have also become a rapidly 
growing demographic group within the union movement, especially within the last 
two decades. Asher expects the number of minorities in unions to grow claiming 
“Current earnings data indicates, everything else being equal, that minorities may 
have a lot to gain financially by being unionized” (Asher 200: 36). The broader 
question relating to all these demographic changes remains what the impact will be 
on how unions operate politically? The intuitive answer is that if a base of an 
organization changes so drastically there will most likely be a shift in the values held 
by that organization. Having cliamed this, labor has been bound by the principles of 
class consciousness and worker unity thoughout its entire existence, perhaps these 
values will transcend demographic changes. 
Changing Party Dynamics 
 In 1996 historian Robert Radosh predicted that “Public employee unions and 
the liberal Hollywood elite will likely be the main backers of the Democratic Party- 
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and it will be these elements that any would be candidate will have to turn to” (Dark 
2001:13).  Although Radosh has left out the key faction of minority voters, his 
assessment of the contemporary Democratic constituent base appears fairly 
accurate. In combination with overall falling private sector union membership and 
demographic changes, the base of the Democratic Party has fundamentally changed 
since FDR’s New Deal Coalition. This process began in the years following the 
tumultuous 1968 convention when conflict emerged between the anti war 
progressive wing of the party and pro labor factions. In 1972 AFL-CIO President 
George Meaney, refused to endorse Democratic nominee George McGovern because 
of his stance on the Vietnam War (Asher 2001:12). In 1976 unions were not 
satisfied with the nomination of southerner Jimmy Carter. His presidency angered 
labor further when in the late 1970s, he backed unpopular austerity measures in the 
height of a recession. Carter also refused to sign legislation that would have 
protected workers who organized boycotts and strikes (Zelizer 2004). These events 
seem to support a narrative that along with declining raw union membership, an 
enthusiasm gap between labor and the Democratic Party may have been 
progressing for a number of years.  
This pattern of separation between labor and the Democratic party was only 
exacerbated by the politics of both Richard Nixon and Ronald Reagan, who were 
able to focus on issues that appealed to disaffected white, working class voters. In 
1972 Nixon campaigned against “Acid, amnesty and abortion.” During his California 
gubernatorial run in 1966 Reagan spoke about the “Filthy speech movement,” a 
direct rebuttal to the “Free speech movement” that had spread across college 
campuses and into the Democratic Party in the 60s and 70s” (Teixeira and Judis 
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2004:24). This rhetoric helped unite traditional blue-collar, (often Catholic) voters 
against their traditional party of choice. According to Teixeira and Judis Republicans 
“Exploited the generation gap between parents and children but also the gap the 
blue-collar and middle class taxpayers who funded universities and the long-haired 
upper middle class students who attended them”(2004:16). Reagan followed up his 
socially conservative rhetoric during his 1980 presidential campaign with concrete 
policy proposals that included a constitutional amendment to ban abortion. He also 
moved to protect prayer in schools in an effort to paint Democrats as being out of 
touch with America’s traditional Christian values (Judis and Texeira:28). In keeping 
with the Republican’s outreach to middle America, Reagan campaigned as an ardent 
supporter of second amendment rights with the GOP’s 1980 party platform stating 
that the 1968 Gun Control Act “Did not significantly impact on crime but served 
rather to restrain the law-abiding citizen in his legitimate use of firearms (1980 GOP 
Platform). 
 This stance complimented Reagan’s position on crime and in particular his 
tough anti drug rhetoric, allowing Republicans to paint Jimmy Carter as someone 
weak on crime and not supportive of law enforcement. This message seemed to 
resonate with blue collar voters who still viewed the Democratic Party as a facilitator 
of the perceived chaos and lawlessness that characterized much of the 1960s and 
70s. Moreover, Reagan’s strong anti communist rhetoric was successful in appealing 
to working class Democrats who felt alienated by their party’s support for peaceful 
co-existence with the Soviet Union (Tiexieira;Judis 2004:121). This strategy 
successfully drove a wedge between the progressive factions who were aided by the 
counter culture movement and the more traditional labor wing of the party who 
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believed in a strong foreign policy. This wedge was aided by the persistence of the 
Iranian Hostage Crisis and the inability of the Carter administration to effectively 
resolve it. More importantly Democrats were once again perceived as being weak 
domestically and feckless abroad, standing in stark contrast to Reagan’s Republican 
Party that ran a campaign based on strong American leadership.   
After the Reagan era labor leaders became more disillusioned with Democrats 
when centrist Bill Clinton became the new face of the party. What followed was 
further market deregulation, welfare reform and most notably NAFTA (Zelizer 2004). 
While unions still overwhelmingly support Democratic candidates, their political and 
legislative clout has been reduced and their once inseparable bond with the party 
has been greatly severed. According findings in Asher’s book, between 1964 and 
1996 union member’s feelings towards the Democratic Party and the union 
movement itself had fallen 14 percentage points, a far greater decline than 
member’s feelings on big business and the Republican Party (2001:43).  This may 
indicate that union rank and file members may feel disconnected from a party that 
used to represent their values. It also shows a degree of disatisfation with labor 
leadership amongst members, possibly due to the continual support that union 
leaders gave to the Democratic Party. Although union leaders still very much favored 
Democrats, their base may have been moving away from the traditional partisan line 
followed by labor since the 1930s. 
Richard Freeman from the Bureau of Economic Research provides a different 
hypothesis. He claims that Democrats have taken union support for granted and 
therefore place little emphasis on engaging in political fights over labor driven 
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political goals (Freeman 2005: 38). This was a key product of the Clinton 
administration when Democrats failed to get striker replacement laws and halt the 
implementation of NAFTA (Zelizer 2004). This phenomenon illustrates a different 
cause of the discontent, yet the negative member sentiment towards the Democratic 
Party remains the result. The legislative clout that labor once held has clearly 
diminished. Because of this, unions have recently focused more heavily on local 
campaigns where funds and mobilization efforts can have a more direct influence on 
policy shaping at a state level (Freeman 2005:28). Having said this, unions still 
direct the vast majority of their mobilization efforts as well as their donations 
towards the Democratic Party. As Asher explains “Unions gave almost all their 
contribution-about 95% in the 1990s- to the Democratic Party. They also increased 
the amount of donations compared to previous decades” (2001:12). This reinforces 
the suggestion that union leadership (those directing fundraising activities), may 
have a more positive view of the Democratic Party than their membership. If this 
were the case Democrat’s would still have the organizational tools of labor at their 
disposal but it is be possible that the floor of grass roots support could fall out from 
under them. 
Unions Politics and Race 
While unions will maintain that their organizations were a centerpiece of the 
civil rights movement, racial issues have played a role in splintering the political 
unity that once existed within heavily unionized regions of the country. This was 
particularly telling during the late 1960s and 70s in the Midwest and Northeast when 
racial divisions became highlighted within party politics. The emergence of race as a 
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key election issue was effective in changing the political landscape of working class 
cities and towns that were once Democratic strongholds. Many blue-collar whites 
that (with the assistance of union mobilization efforts) had traditionally based their 
support for Democrats around economic issues, were now factoring in the turbulent 
events of the civil rights movement into their political decision making (Teixeir and 
Judis 2004:22). For example in 1960, blue-collar Macomb County in northern Detroit 
(where racial tensions had been growing with the emergene of African American 
migration from the south) voted 63% for John F Kennedy. In 1968 Richard Nixon 
received 30% of the vote and segregationist George Wallace received a hefty 14%. 
By 1980 the political landscape of this predominately white county had completely 
transformed, when they voted 52% for Reagan. Four years later Reagan received 
66% of Macomb county votes (Teixeira and Judis 2004:22). 
 A similar phenomenon took place in the working class white county of Lorain 
in Cleveland Ohio.(Teixeira and Judis 2004:26) According to Democratic pollster 
Stanley Greenberg voters in places like Macomb carried deep racial resentment. He 
made the claim that this resentment “Shapes their attitudes toward government, 
particularly spending and taxation and the linkage between them, there was a 
widespread sentiment that the Democratic Party supported giveaway programs 
aimed specifically at minorities.” (Teixeira and Judis 2004:24) This argument claims 
that racial tensions were at the heart of much of the transition that took place within 
party politics during this era. 
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The Rise of Racial Politics 
Many scholars have argued that during the post war era there has been a 
movement away from political parties being divided on class and a movement 
towards party divisions based on racial polarization. The Democratic Party which had 
traditionally won elections on the backs of  large coalitions of working, white voters 
have seen this base demographic slowly dwindle in the post industrial world. Writing 
in the 1980s Robert Huckfeldt addresses an argument that claims that the shrinking 
working class has changed the issue priorities of voters and therefore changed the 
electoral dynamics. “Quality of life issues have replaced quantity of life issues. 
Concerns over minimum wage increase, workplace safety, social security and 
unemployment compensation have frequently given way to a number of non-
material issue concerns: energy, the environment, prolife versus prochoice and so 
on”(Huckfeldt 1989:4). This thesis can be anecdotally observed as it is evident that 
we have seen a rise of social and other non-material issues within the political 
discourse that have helped shape the structure of political parties in the post war 
era. Instead of focusing at great lengths on issues like the rights of workers to 
organize, the Democratic Party has broadened its appeal, focusing heavily on 
environmental issues, female reproductive rights and other issues that progressives 
hold dear.  However Huckfeldt pushes back on this argument as the lone 
determinant of the decline of class in American politics. He views demographic 
changes in certain geographical areas as a key factor in creating tensions in places 
where the working class had been traditionally racially (not ethnically) homogenous 
(1989:4).  
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In the 1940s and 50s, African Americans migrated in large numbers from the 
south, in the hope to find factory jobs in cities across the north.  “During this period 
organized labor often played a critical role in introducing blacks to the Democratic 
Party” (Huckfeldt 1989:6). In the early days of the New Deal Coalition both 
electorally and legislatively, the Democratic Party did little to appeal to blacks 
(Hadley and Ladd 1978:34). President Roosevelt and his party were still tightly 
bound to southern Democrat’s who vehemently opposed civil rights (Huckfeldt 
1989:7). It would be through northern labor unions that African Americans would 
become recognized as a critical faction within the party. As Huckfeldt explains, “Thus 
they adopted the political preference and supported the political organizations that 
coincided with their status as members of the urban working class” (1989:5). 
Critically, shrewd Democratic leaders like Lyndon B. Johnson saw immense 
opportunity in a potential swath of new voters. Because of this the party 
establishment began to become more sympathetic to the civil rights cause and other 
issues close to the heart of black voters in a hope to bring in an emmerging 
demographic (Huckfeldt 1989:6).  
The same could not be said about many white blue-collar, northern voters 
who objected to changes in the workplace and within their political party. As 
Huckfeldt notes, “Their place within organized labor and the Democratic Party was 
never fully secure. They were frequently resented by whites who viewed them with 
suspicion and treated them with hostility” (1989:6). This argument seems to suggest 
that the party leadership was willing to change its views on race but traditional 
union influenced supporters were not. The tension that took place in northern cities 
across the country became the catalyst for race riots and racial hostilities that would 
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become a common feature of the 1960s (Abu Lughod 2007:12). Evidence of the 
effects of these racial divisions can be seen above, by the decay of white Democratic 
voters in working class counties like Macomb, Michigan and Lorain Ohio. These 
trends appear to characterize a modern party system less divided by class and more 
heavily divided by race. 
Hypothesis and Experimental Design 
In considering the literature above I will attempt to test the relative 
effectiveness of labor unions in the political arena. To achieve this I will gather data 
from both the 1960 and 2008 election cycles in order to draw similarities and 
contrasts between labor’s impacts within the electorate. More importantly this study 
aims to see the effects that the decline in union membership has had on different 
aspects of the electoral process. In particular I wanted to test labor’s influence in 
mobilizing voters to see if its relative decline has had any impact on turnout 
particularly amongst white voters. Moreover, testing labor’s influence within the 
Democratic Party will reveal much about how unions fit into the shifting dynamics of 
modern day party politics.  
 From much of the research above it appears that unions have historically 
succeeded in creating electoral unity amongst members, by bringing in workers from 
different backgrounds who share  relatively homogonous views. Different 
demographic groups in different regional areas who otherwise would not be voting 
in unison, are brought together through organization and top down mobilization. I 
want to test if this bind still exists within an electorate with a lower density of union 
workers. In particular I want to see if union decline is affecting the departure of 
21 
 
white voters from the Democratic Party. This crucial demographic of working class 
white voters is redefining party politics and shifting the platform of appeal within 
both parties. Looking into the voting patterns of union members will enable future 
research to track where many of these voters will end up if the current trend of 
union decline persists.  
 In order to see variation within the data, I decided to focus on two election 
cycles with similar characteristics. The election years of 1960 and 2008 share a 
number of similarities. Both were won by Democratic candidates who were able to 
generate large turnout in relation to previous general elections cycles. Both 
candidates also did not receive the benefits of incumbency because the presidency 
was an open seat. Moreover in both contests a Republican President was presiding 
over an economy in recession, effectively emboldening the campaigns of the two 
Democratic candidates (John F. Kennedy and Barack Obama). Measuring the 
contrasts in terms of union influence on these cycles will illustrate the impact of 
declining union membership within the electorate.  
My hypothesis therefore is that as union membership declines, the level of 
white democratic turnout as well as the overall level of white Democratic affiliation 
will fall. This paper will measure turnout as the percentage of eligible voters who 
returned a ballot in some capacity (including mail in and absentee ballots). I will 
measure the level of Democratic affiliation by placing those surveyed who consider 
themselves to be strong, weak or as independent leaning Democratic into one 
category. Further coding details are available below. In defining union members I 
will include survey respondents who answered, “Yes” to the question of “If they or 
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anyone else in their family belonged to a labor union?” Evidence shows that families 
with ties to the labor movement are likely to hold many of the same political values 
and follow the voting patterns of actual union members 
In justifying the turnout aspect of my hypothesis I looked to include the 
research mentioned above regarding how unions have been able to mobilize their 
members and others in the community. The loss of a strong union presence in a 
community would result in a loss of the type of grass roots voter outreach efforts 
that have characterized the electoral activity of labor for so long. Moreover as 
membership declines people who once based their partisanship on their ties to their 
union will be less inclined to vote Democratic when that tie is broken. In other words 
non-union white voters will be far less likely to be Democratic than their union 
counterparts.  
In gathering data for this paper I found that it was most effective to access 
individual level results through the survey data provided by the American National 
Election Studies data center. This site has given researchers data on pre and post-
election surveys since 1948. I used the time series page for both the 1960 and 2008 
elections. The format of the surveys allows me to create two separate data sets 
within STATA software and observe both sets by contrasting the results from a 
number of different variables within each election cycle. Besides questions on 
contextually relevant issues, most of the questions remained the same in both 
cycles. A large number of survey questions also enables me to gather data for other 
variables and test them against both my turnout and part affiliation variables. In 
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doing this I was able to create an education variable that would assist in showing 
the role that class played in both election cycles. 
Both the 1960 and 2008 surveys ask respondents if anyone in their family is a 
member of a union. I therefore decided to use this to determine the level of 
unionization. Another question asks, “Which party you most closely identify with?” 
This question gives respondents the opportunity to give the party they affiliate most 
closely with or respond accordingly if they are pure independents. I therefore 
categorized all those who considered themselves to be strong Democrats, weak 
Democrats and independent leaning Democrat into one category and all other 
respondents into the other. A further question asks respondents to name their race. 
In the 1960 questionnaire the only options are, “White or Negro” whereas in the 
2008 questionnaire respondents are given a range of different racial identity options. 
The result of this discrepancy is that many Hispanics and Asian Americans would 
have been considered white in the 1960 survey. This is an issue that is difficult to 
combat, considering this question is the only way of quantifying the race of the 
respondent within the survey data. In order to create a dichotomous variable to 
focus on the patterns of white voters I decided to simply categorize respondents as 
white or non-white for the benefit of the two data sets. For the race aspect of this 
paper I hypothesize that party affiliation will become far more racially homogonous 
in 2008 than it was in 1960. In other words, white voters who were affiliated with 
the Democratic Party on a class basis in 1960, will be more inclined to vote along 
racial lines in 2008. This process that Huckfeldt writes about, may be the first sign of 
race replacing class as the main determinant for party affiliation in American politics.  
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When looking at many of these variables it is impossible not to acknowledge 
the potential regional variations that could be taking shape across the country. This 
is especially true with race, where the political impacts of racial politics have often 
differed regionally. For example, black turnout was largely suppressed during the 
Jim Crow era in the south. I want to see if the data is showing race driven turnout 
variation purely in the south or instead across the country. To illustrate this I created  
two region variables, one comprising of southern states and one comprising of 
Midwestern (or in the case of the 2008 survey these states were called “North 
Central states) states. I gathered state codes from both surveys and created 
separate dichotomous south and Midwest variables, where respondents were either 
categorized as residing in the south or elsewhere or in the Midwest or elsewhere. 
These two dichotomous variables will capture differences in regional effects for the 
south and Midwest relative to the rest of the country. Having access to this regional 
data will allow readers to gain a broader understanding of the geographic patterns 
related to these trends. 
Finally the question of turnout is something often scrutinized within survey 
related data. In both of these post-election surveys the question lists a number of 
different reasons why people have chosen not to vote in the past. They then give 
respondents a range of different options with only one indicating that the 
respondent voted. By offering respondents options like “I thought about voting but 
didn’t,” surveyors are able to reduce the number of people who claim to have voted 
but did not. Once again I created a dichotomous variable by categorizing those who 
voted and those who did not into two categories. By recording each variable code 
and downloading the data into the Stata program, I was able to begin to process 
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and further analyze my results. A detailed summary of the raw ANES survey 
questions as well as my processed dichotomous variables created through Stata 
available in the Apendix. 
 
Formal Hypotheses 
H1: As union membership declines, the level of whites that affiliate with the 
Democratic Party will decline. 
H2: As union membership declines and the union base changes, the ability of labor 
to effectively politically mobilize will deteriorate leading to a fall in union turnout 
H3: As race becomes a larger factor in partisan affiliation, the impact of class and 
party affiliation will decline. 
Descriptive Results 
Prior to delving into analysis of the relationships within the data it is important 
to understand the basic features of the political landscape in 1960 and nearby half a 
century later in 2008. In doing, this I ran a number of basic cross table descriptions 
on STATA to give readers perspective on my findings and also to illustrate contrast 
between my 1960 and 2008 data sets. Moreover it is important to compare the 
survey data for each of my variables to other sources like the census bureau in order 
to test the raw validity of the numbers.  A description of this data gives readers a 
chance to understand the world in which my study is operating within. 
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I found that in 1960 the percentage of households with a union member was 
25.4%. While there is limited data on union households, according to the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics the unionization rate at that time was a little over 26% (Bureau of 
Labor Statistics: Union Membership). In 2008 the ANES data showed that 11.5% of 
households contained a union member.The BLS reported in 2013 that 11.3% of 
American workers belonged to a union (Bureau of Labor Statistics: Union 
Membership). While not identicle my data seems to match the numbers of other 
sources by illustrating a sharp decline in union membership. The survey data 
presented on race would prove slightly more complicated due to the structure of the 
ANES survey. In 1960 respondents were categorized as either “White” or “Negro” 
whereas in 2008, various other options for racial identity were included in the 
survey. Most notably in 1960 Hispanic and Asian Americans were categorized as 
white. However in 2008 the respondents were given the option of “non-hispanic 
white,” effectively narrowing the definition of a white respondent. In 1960 my 
results found that 91% of the population was white (as defined by the question) 
with 8.8% described as black. According to census data the African American 
population in 1960 stood at 10.5%, just above the number provided in  the ANES 
data (US Census Bureau: Population Estimates). In 2008, after creating a 
dichotomous variable between white and other, the survey data showed that 51% of 
respondents identified as white while 49% identified as another race. According to 
2010 census data this figure is considered high, with their numbers indicating that 
36.2% of the population is nonwhite and 63.7% white (US Census 
Bureau:Population Estimates). For my party affiliation variable, the ANES data 
indicates that in 1960 52% of respondents identified as Democrats or independents 
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that leaned Democratic and 48% of respondents made up the rest of the electorate. 
According to Pew Research figures from the same year, 46% of people identified as 
Democrats (or Democratic leaners) and 52% of people were either independents or 
Republicans (Pew Research: Party Affiliation). This disparity may be due to the fact 
that in the Pew data, 2% of people identified with other, meaning a third party. I 
grouped all other party’s within the survey into the “not Democratic” category. 
Moreover the ANES data was a part of an election survey during a cycle where the 
Democratic candidate was favored. Depending on when the Pew survey was 
conducted the influence of an election may have boosted the number of Democrats 
and independents leaning Democratic within the ANES data. My 2008 data set shows 
that 42% of respondents identified as Democrat’s and Democratic leaning 
independents. 58% of respondents identified as Republicans or pure independents. 
This data resembles the same Pew survey fairly closely that found 57% of voters 
identified as Republicans or pure independents and 36% of voters with Democratic 
preferences (Pew Research: Party Affiliation).  
Creating a turnout variable from survey data has been a consistently difficult 
practice for political scientists for a number of years. Researchers encounter the 
issue of respondents saying they voted when in reality they failed to cast a ballot. 
Moreover ANES estimates that the average time of the survey was around an hour, 
meaning that those who stay for the entirety of the survey are often people engaged 
or interested with the political process. Studies have shown that these people are 
more likely to vote, therefore exaggerating the actual turnout figure within the 
survey. It is also important to note that because this survey data operates at an 
individual level, the figures represent the probability of any voter voting on an 
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aggregate level. This means that any increase in turnout within a certain group, is a 
reflection of an increased probability that individual’s within that group voted. By 
creating a dichotomous variable I categorized those who voted (as 1) and those who 
did not (as 0), accordingly. The survey data shows that in 1960 77% of respondents 
said that they voted in some capacity (including absentee and mail in ballots) as 
opposed to 23% that said they did not vote at all. Census bureau data finds that 
turnout during this cycle was 62.8% (US Census Bureau: Voting and registration). In 
2008 the ANES data shows turnout sitting at 76% with the census bureau figures 
showing turnout at 57% (US Census Bureau: Voting and registration). Both cycles 
show a typical inflation of turnout numbers expected from survey data. 
In keeping with the analysis on the prevailing trend of more white collar 
union members, I created an education variable that could both measure the shifts 
in the education level of union members and look more broadly at the impact of 
class on voter turnout and party affiliation. In doing this I categorized individual’s 
within the survey who had at least some college education or greater as 1 and 
individual’s with a high school diploma or less as 0. The survey data indicates that in 
1960 20.75% of those surveyed had received some form of a college education 
(even if they did not earn a degree). No outside sources had statistics that matched 
my defined variable but according to the Statista data base, roughly 16% of the 
population had a college degree (Statista: Education Stats). Because my variable 
includes individuals’ who attended college but may not have attained a degree, I 
would expect this figure to be larger than the survey data. In the 2008 cycle the 
number of college educated individual’s jumps to 56.2% (Statista: Education Stats).   
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Statista reports that in 2008 59% of American’s had a college degree. This reflects 
some disparity between the survey data and this outside source. 
 
 
 
 
Unions and Party Affiliation 1960 
Party Identification Union Non Union Total 
Strong Democrat 93 (35%) 175 (65%) 268 
Weak Democrat 77 (27%) 205  (73%) 282 
Independent Leaning 
Dem 
19 (29%) 47 (71%) 66 
  True Independent 33 (31%) 73 (69%) 106 
Independent Leans 
Republican 
20 (27%) 54 (73%) 74 
Weak Republican 30 (19%) 132 (81%) 162 
Strong Republican 20 (11%) 154 (89%) 174 
Apolitical 7 42 49 
Total 300 (25%) 881 (75%) 1,181 (100%) 
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Unions and Party Affiliation 2008 
Party 
Identification 
Union Non Union Total 
Strong Democrat 90 (16%) 485 (84%) 575 (100%) 
Weak Democrat 54 (14%) 336 (86%) 390 (100%) 
Independent 
Leaning Democrat 
42 (11%) 349 (89%) 391 (100%) 
True Independent  23 (9%) 239 (91%) 262 (100%) 
Independent Lean 
Republican 
24 (11%) 199 (89%) 223 (100%) 
Weak Republican 18 (9%) 181 (95%) 199 (100%) 
Strong Republican 22 (10%) 207 (90%) 229 (100%) 
Unaffiliated  2 (5%) 37 (95%)  39 (100%) 
Total 275 (12%) 2,033 (88%) 2,308(100%) 
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  Although I use a dichotomous variable when conducting multiple regression 
tests, I decided that expanding the variable would assist in detailing the 
concentration of union members across the political spectrum. As expected we see 
the highest proportion of union members in the “Strong Democrat” category in both 
election cycles. However the concentration is much more spread out within the 2008 
data indicating that political affiliation amongst union members may have become 
more diverse in 2008. In 1960, 65% of indivdiauls’ considered strong Democrats 
were not in a union. By 2008 that number rises 19 points to 84%. This shows that 
the most partisan Democratic category contains less union influence in 2008. 
Meanwhile the opposite category of strong Republicans has seen just a 1% shift in 
the concentration of union members between 1960 and 2008. 
Union Demographics 1960 
Race Union Member Non-Union Member Total 
White 274 (91%) 802 (91%) 1,076 (91%) 
Non-White 26 (9%) 79 (9%) 105 (9%) 
Total 300 (25%) 881 (75%) 1,181 (100%) 
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Union Demographics 2008                  
Race Union Member Non-Union Member Total 
White 137 (50%) 1,042 (51%) 1,179 (51%) 
Non-White 138 (50%) 991 (49%) 1,129 (49%) 
Total 275 (12%) 2,033 (88%) 2,308 (100%) 
 
      
These numbers show the changing demographics within the labor movement 
that broadly reflect the demographic changes nationwide. According to the ANES 
data non-white union members now make up the majority (by a slim margin) of 
unionized workers. This seems to reinforce the BLS study cited above, that claims 
that in 2015, African American’s were more likely to be in a union than whites 
(Bureau of Labor Statistics: Labor Union Members). While these numbers could be 
inflated by Hispanic American’s lack of racial identity options in the 1960 survey, 
these results say a lot about the changing profile of organized labor. Once mostly 
white, organizations now mirror the growing diversity across American society that 
has had such a profound impact on party dynamics. This process may be a 
contributing factor to a phenomenon explored in detail by Huckfeldt. For decades 
political parties have generally reflected societies class divisions. In recent years the 
division between parties is becoming overwhelmingly race based (Huckfeldt 
1989:13). The disintegration of unions as organizations that kept their members 
politically and ideologically united may be having an effect on the binding nature of 
class in the electoral arena. 
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Unions and Turnout 1960 
 
Voter Status Union Non-Union Total 
Voted 234 (78%) 678 (77%) 912 (77%) 
Did Not Vote 66 (22%) 203 (23%) 269 (23%) 
Total 300 (25%) 881 (75%) 1,181 (100%) 
 
 
 
Unions and Turnout 2008 
Voter Status Union Non-Union Total 
Voted 202 (82%) 1,390 (75%) 1,592 (76%) 
Did Not Vote 44 (18%) 455 (25%) 269 (23%) 
Total 246 (12%) 1,845 (88%) 2,091 (100%) 
 
When looking at the descriptive statistics of union membership and voter 
turnout we see very little variation in an individual’s union status impacting the 
probability of them voting. In 1960 union members are slightly more likely to vote 
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(by about 1 percentage point) than non-union members. In 2008 the gap in the 
likelihood of turnout grew to indicate that union members were 7% points more 
likely to vote than non-union members. Multiple regressions tests will conclude if this 
gap is statistically significant or simply due to error variance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Education Level of Union Members 1960 
 
Education Level Union Non-Union Total 
College 
Educated 
31 (10%) 214 (25%) 245 
(21%) 
No College 269 (90%) 667 (75%) 936 
(79%) 
Total 300 (25%) 881 (75%) 1,181 
(100%) 
 
 
 
 
Education Level of Union Members 2008 
 
Education Level Union Non-Union Total 
College 
Educated 
176 (64%) 1,125 (55%) 1,301 
(56%) 
No College 99 (36%) 908 (45%) 1,017 
(44%) 
Total 275 (12%) 2,033 (88%) 2,308 
(100%) 
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Before analyzing this data it is important to reinforce that individuals 
categorized as “College Educated” responded by claiming that they had been college 
educated in some way even if they did not complete a college degree. Those 
categorized as “No College” represent respondents with a high school diploma or 
less. When looking at the education level of union members an interesting pattern 
emerges. In 1960 union members were much less likely to have received any college 
education than those who were not in a labor union. This perhaps indicates the 
prevalence of blue collar manufacturing jobs in 1960 when union members were 
rarely college educated. In 2008 however, the union members surveyed were more 
likely to have gone through some form of college education than non-union 
members. This seems to support the narrative painted by Asher, who when writing 
in 1999 recognized the trend of emerging white collar union members (Asher 
2001:30). The new face of labor may be reflecting the increased ratio of public 
sector workers who stand in contrast to the traditional manufacturing membership 
base. The effects of this change will be telling if it is impacting voter mobilization as 
well as labor’s political outreach overall. In accordance with the changing 
demographic profiles of union members, the movement towards more white collar 
union jobs is illustrated through the massive increase in college educated union 
members appearing within the data. Moreover it will be interesting to observe the 
relationship that class (reflected by education level) has with both the 1960 and 
2008 elections. The overwhelming increase in individuals who attended college in all 
groups may influence the pattern of class voting. 
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Multiple Regression Analysis 
 
 
Table 1. Determinants of Party Affiliation  
Party Affiliation  
DV: 1= Dem 
        0= All other respondents 
1960 B(se) 2008 B(se) 
Union 
(Union=1 No Union=0) 
.128 (.033)*** .113(.030)*** 
Race 
(White=1 Non-White=0) 
-.012(.051) -.317(.019)*** 
Education 
College=1 No College-0 
-.122(.036)*** .005 (.020) 
Constant .525(.049)*** .565(0.017)*** 
N 1181 2,308 
R-squared .04 .1088 
P<.05** P<.01*** 
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Table 2. Determinants of Turnout 
Turnout 
DV: 1= Voted 
        0= Did not Vote 
1960 B(se) 2008 B(se) 
Union 
(Union=1 No Union=0) 
.028(.027) .054(.028) 
Race 
(White=1 Non-White=0) 
.342(.041)*** .029(.114) 
Education 
College=1 No College-0 
.130(.021)*** .166(.019)*** 
 
Constant .423(.029)*** .645(.017) 
N 1181 2,308 
R-squared .072 .041 
P<.05** P<.01*** 
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Table 3. Party Affiliation with Region  
Party Affiliation 
DV: 1= Dem 
        0= All other respondents 
1960 B(se) 2008 B(se) 
Union (Rest of Country) .147(.033)*** .098(.030) ** 
 
Race (White Rest of 
Country) 
 
 
-.160(.086) 
 
 
-.265(.033)*** 
 
Region South (Non-White  
South) 
 
-.167(.106) 
 
.027(.031) 
 
Region Midwest (Non 
White Midwest) 
 
-.061(.147) 
 
.152(.046)** 
 
RaceXRegion South 
(White South) 
 
 
.389(.111)*** 
 
 
-.089(.432)**. 
 
RaceXRegion Midwest 
(WhiteMidwest) 
 
 
.019(.151) 
 
 
-.120(.059)** 
 
Education (Rest of 
Country) 
 
-.123(.035)*** 
 
.011(.012) 
   
Constant .618(.038)*** .523(.027)*** 
N 1181 2091 
R-Squared .072 .117 
P<.05** P<.01*** 
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Table 4. Voter Turnout with Region 
Voter Turnout 
DV: 1=Voted 
        0= Did not vote 
1960 B(se) 2008 B(se) 
Union (Rest of Country) -.003(.027) .044(.029) 
 
Race (White Rest of 
Country) 
 
 
.293(.071)*** 
 
 
.039(.031) 
 
Region South (Non-White  
South) 
 
-.260(.087)** 
 
.007(.029) 
 
Region Midwest (Non 
White Midwest) 
 
.187(.121) 
 
.134(.043) 
 
RaceXRegion South 
(White South) 
 
 
.121(.092) 
 
 
-.001(.041) 
 
RaceXRegion Midwest 
(White Midwest) 
 
 
-238(.125)** 
 
 
-.087(.055) 
 
Education (Rest of 
Country) 
 
.122(.029)*** 
 
.171(.019)*** 
   
Constant .542(.067)*** .623(.026)*** 
N 1181 2091 
R-Squared .072 .117 
P<.05** P<.01*** 
 
 
Discussion 
I first ran a test that measured the determinants of party affiliation against a 
number of different variables for both election cycles. In 1960 I found a statistically 
significant relationship between union membership and party affiliation. This means 
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that union members are more likely to be Democrats at a statistically significant 
level. This result was not surprising, as I had an expectation based on the literature 
that there would be a strong relationship during a period when union membership 
was high and there had been clear political unity between the labor movement and 
the Democratic Party. During the 1960 cycle union members were almost 13% more 
likely to be Democrat’s than non-union members. In 2008 we see that the 
relationship between union membership and Democratic affiliation is still statistically 
significant. In this case union members are roughly 11% more likely to be 
Democrat’s. The fact that this relationship still exists seems to promote the narrative 
that union leaders and in particular their members still overwhelmingly support 
Democrat’s. This does not necessarily mean that they are still a dominant force 
within party politics as we know that the raw membership numbers have declined 
from 25% in 1960 to 12% in 2008 (according to the ANES survey data). Having said 
this, evidence suggests that while unions are shrinking in size they are still a loyal 
and therefore still important part of the Democratic base. 
In this same test I measured how race is interacting with indivual’s party 
affilation. In 1960 I observed no statistical significance between race and Democratic 
affiliation. White American’s were not voting for Democrats at a statistically 
significant level. In 2008 however I observed race become statistically significant at 
a negative level. Astoundingly, whites were 31% less likely to affiliate with 
Democrats than non-whites. This jump in the relationship between race and party 
affiliation seems to show a trend of racial divisions amongst political parties. In 
contrast to this, we can observe that education and party affiliation are negatively 
correlated within the 1960 set. This means that college educated voters were around 
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12% less likely to vote Democratic than voters who received no college education. 
This relationship seems to reinforce the notion that the Democrats used to be the 
party of blue collar workers who were less likely to be college educated. In 2008, the 
negative relationship between education level and being affiliated with the 
Democratic Party becomes statistically insignificant. These tests show that party 
divisions that used to be based on class are now based on race. White’s used to be 
no less likely to be affiliated with Democrat’s than non-whites. Instead, an 
individual’s education (or by extension their class status) level was a major 
determinant of party affiliation. This phenomenon appears to have switched during 
the 2008 cycle. Whites are now significantly less likely to vote Democratic and an 
individual’s education status does not appear to be impacting their pattern of party 
affiliation at any significant level. What my data shows is that the white working 
class base that for so long characterized the Democratic Party appears to be 
disappearing. What this will mean for the values the party stands for and the 
candidates that it puts forward remains uncertain.  
I then wanted to test the effects that region had on party affiliation and racial 
voting patterns in both cycles. The addition of the two region variables indicates that 
union members from outside the south and Midwest are more likely to be 
Democratic at a statistically significant level. In 2008 that relationship still exists but 
with a lower coefficient, perhaps showing that unions are becoming less 
concentrated with members who affiliate with Democrats. Moreover we see non-
whites in both the Midwest and the south in a statistically insignificant relationship 
with Democratic affiliation in 1960. This seems to indicate that African American 
voters in particular have yet to fully align with the Democratic Party. By 2008 non-
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white voters in the Midwest are almost 15% more likely to be Democrats, a figure 
that is significant. The same is not true in the south where non-whites are not more 
likely to be Democrats at any significant rate. This surprising finding may be a 
product of my dichotomous race variable, where non-black voters are included in the 
category of non-white. Hispanics and Asian American’s in the south may be voting 
less Democratic than traditional African American voters in the south. What is 
evident is the massive shift in white Democratic affiliates in the south. In 1960 white 
southerners were 38% more likely to align with the Democrats (a statistically 
significant figure). By 2008 they were 8% less likely to be Democrats, showing 
negative statistical significance. In the Midwest white voters were no more likely to 
affiliate with the Democratic Party then with any other political party in 1960. This 
indicates the competitive nature of presidential races in Midwestern states at that 
time. By 2008 a negative relationship between white Midwesterners and the 
Democratic Party took hold. This demographic is now 12% less likely to be 
Democratic. These results seem to show the racial transformation that has taken 
place within American politics.  All over the country white voters have left the 
Democratic Party and increasingly non-white voters have replaced them. The party 
no longer seems to be a home for working class voters and if this trend continues 
we could see an even more pronounced racial division within party politics. 
The next test I conducted measured the effects that certain variables, in 
particular union membership has on the likelihood of individual’s voting. I was very 
surprised to see that union membership did not influence the likelihood of voting at 
a statistically significant level during either cycle. Perhaps the inflated level of 
turnout within the survey data may lower the variation in voting between union 
43 
 
members and non-union members. In 1960, race and turnout are statistically 
significant, showing that white voters are 34% more likely to vote. In 2008 there is 
no statistical significance between being white and turning out. Education level 
appears to be a major determinant of the likelihood of voting. In both 1960 and 
2008 someone who is college educated is more likely to vote (13% more likely in 
1960 and close to 17% in 2008). This represents a phenomenon discussed by Nagler 
and Leiley,that poorer American’s are less likely to turnout and therefore more 
isolated and underrepresented by the political system (Nagler:Leighley 2008:4). 
They hypothesized that unions would help to organize these isolated voters and turn 
them into a formidable part of the electorate. The survey data however does not 
seem to support this claim for either cycle. 
In order to understand whether race and voter turnout were explicitly linked 
to the Jim Crow south or a broader nationwide phenomenon, I added both my 
southern and Midwest region variable to both sets. The results show that non-white 
voters in the south were clearly disenfranchised in 1960 by being 26% less likely to 
vote than their white counterparts (a figure showing negative statistical 
significance). In the Midwest we see no statistically significant evidence that non-
whites were less likely to vote. The main take away appears to be that the 
nationwide turnout drag on non-white voters appears to be driven by a southern 
phenomenon. Interestingly in 2008 we see no statistical significance between non-
whites and the likelihood of voting in the south, yet in the Midwest non-whites 
turnout at a negatively statistically significant rate of -13% (compared to their white 
counterparts). Perhaps this regional discrepancy may be due to African Americans in 
the south voting at a high rate because of such a long history of isolation from the 
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electoral process. In 1960 we see a slightly negative relationship between turnout 
and white individuals’. Although this is a difficult phenomenon to describe, there is a 
possibility that in the height of racial tensions in Midwestern cities, white voters may 
have been disillusioned by two candidates (Nixon and Kennedy) that supported 
elements of the civil rights movement. The racial resentment inside of urban labor 
unions that Huckfeldt alludes to, may have meant that swing voters in the Midwest 
could not support any of the candidates (1989:6). By 2008 this relationship 
disappears. In the south in 1960 there was no statistical significance between being 
white and the likelihood of voting. The same statistical insignificance can be 
observed amongst southern whites in 2008.  
Overall when testing for turnout a clear trend can be seen. The racial factors 
that drove the individual probability of voting in 1960 is all but lost in 2008. 
However, an individual’s education is even more of a determinant of voter turnout in 
2008 than it was in 1960. I expected that labor unions would play a larger role in 
driving turnout amongst poorly educated individuals. Instead it appears that unions 
are not playing a significant role in mobilizing their members to vote at any higher 
rate than non-union members.  
When looking at ways in which I could have improved my experiment, I 
believe my turnout variable within the ANES data lacked some accuracy. Voter 
turnout is always a difficult variable to measure, especially within survey data. The 
data is often inflated due to a number of factors revolving around the type of 
respondents surveyed as well as the inclination that individuals have not to give 
accurate information about their voting history. Because of the limitations involved 
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with gathering turnout data (especially from election cycles as far back as 1960) the 
ANES surveys appeared to be the most reliable source that I had access to. While I 
was able to observe interesting trends within the turnout variable, if I were given 
the opportunity to research these patterns in the future I would attempt to find a 
mechanism of gathering turnout data that would more effectively highlight variations 
between different variables.     
 
Conclusion 
Over the past half-century political scientists have observed a significant shift 
in the dynamics of party politics. The Democratic Party has seen its support shift 
from a base of working class and southern voters to a base comprising primarily of 
racial minorities, public sector union members and progressives.  When commencing 
this paper I believed that the decline of unions was playing a major role in the 
declining presence of whites within the Democratic Party. To an extent that 
phenomenon is evident. The raw number of union members has shrunk by over 
13% points between 1960 and 2008. The data shows that union members are 
considerably more likely to be affiliated with Democrats than non-union members. 
The fall in these numbers almost certainly adversely effects the level of Democratic 
support.  
Moreover, the statistical significance between Democratic affiliation and union 
status has weakened in 2008 from 1960. In other words the partisanship within 
labor unions is still present but slightly less pronounced. Evidence of far more 
racially diverse labor organization also highlights that unions are probably no longer 
binding white, working-class Democrats together. The emergence of well-educated 
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white collar union members replacing old manufacturing members appears to 
illustrate that unions are now also less likely to represent working class people. 
While these members are still affiliated with Democrats the decline of blue-collar 
unions may be partially responsible for low educated voters no longer being 
affiliated with the Democratic Party in any significant way. 
   Having written this, the decline in labor unions does not appear to be the 
driving force behind a changing Democratic Party. The findings above show a clear 
trend of a more racially divisive party system in 2008 than what existed in 1960. The 
1960 data shows a party framework that is essentially determined by societal and 
geographic class cleavages. In 2008 we see some staggering numbers that show 
that partisanship has become highly racially divisive across the country. The trend of 
whites moving away from the party appears to have commenced in 1960, although 
the large number of white southerners still affiliated with the Democrats offset this 
trend. Whatever the root cause of this pattern (and there is some evidence that 
union decline has played a role) is, if this shift were to continue one could have 
some fear that the racially polarizing nature of our politics may lead to further racial 
divisions within our society. Moreover the lack of organization surrounding working 
class individuals may result in further isolation from the political system. My results 
show that lower educated individuals are far less likely to participate within the 
electorate in both cycles, yet the gap in 2008 has grown. Compounding this trend is 
the fact that the once politically united working class (reflected by less educated 
voters) vote appears to be splintered, meaning that there could be a lack of 
representation for some of societies most vulnerable members. The shift in the type 
of voters that the Democratic Party is appealing to may also influence the kind of 
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candidates that will be nominated for high office. As Robert Radash predicted, 
Democratic candidates are now more likely to answer to Hollywood progressives 
than manufacturing unions(Dark 2001:13). If this becomes the norm, we may begin 
to see an even more pronounced movement away from candidates with union 
backgrounds. These are just some of the many uncertainties that come with the 
changing nature of American party politics.  
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Apendix 
ANES Survey Questions and Codes 1960: 
 
1) Party Affiliation : VAR600091 
Q. 36. GENERALLY SPEAKING, DO YOU USUALLY THINK OF YOURSELF AS A REPUBLICAN, A DEMOCRAT, AN 
INDEPENDENT, OR WHAT. Q.36A. (IF REP OR DEM) WOULD YOU CALL YOURSELF A STRONG (R) (D) OR NOT A 
VERY STRONG (R) (D). Q.36E. (IF INDEPENDENT OR OTHER) DO YOU THINK OF YOURSELF AS CLOSER TO 
THE REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRATIC PARTY. ............................................................ 389 0. STRONG 
DEMOCRAT 476  
1. NOT VERY STRONG DEMOCRAT 121 2. 
 INDEPENDENT CLOSER TO DEMOCRATS 188 3.  
INDEPENDENT ('NO, NEITHER' OR 'DK' TO Q.36E) 128 4. INDEPENDENT CLOSER TO REPUBLICANS 263 5.  
NOT VERY STRONG REPUBLICAN 299 6.  
STRONG REPUBLICAN 17 7. OTHER, 
 MINOR PARTY OR REFUSED TO SAY 47 8. APOLITI 
*Stata Dichotomous  
 
      party |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        565       47.84       47.84 
          1 |        616       52.16      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,181      100.00 
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2) Labor Unon Membership Status: VAR 600150 
NAME-ANYONE BLNG TO LBR UNION COLUMNS 395 - 395 NUMERIC MD=GE 8 PD 20. DOES ANYONE IN THIS 
HOUSEHOLD BELONG TO A LABOR UNION. (IF YES) PD 20A. WHO IS IT THAT BELONGS. 
....................................................... 1406 0. NO, NOBODY 261  
1. YES, R (ALONE) BELONGS 195 2 
2. . YES, HEAD (NOT R) (ALONE) BELONGS  
3. 15 3. BOTH R AND HEAD BELONG 32 4. SOMEONE ELSE IN HOUSEHOLD (ALONE) BELONGS  
4. 9 5. R AND SOMEONE ELSE IN HOUSEHOLD BELONG 4 6. HEAD AND SOMEONE ELSE IN  
5. 1 8. DK 31  
6. 9. NA 
 
*Stata dicotomous 
 
      union |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        881       74.60       74.60 
          1 |        300       25.40      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,181      100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
3) Race of Respndent: VAR600119 
NAME-RACE OF RESPONDENT COLUMNS 344 - 344 NUMERIC NO MISSING DATA CODES P2. RACE ......... 1764 
 1. WHITE 172 
 2. NEGRO 
*Stata Dichotomous  
  race |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        105        8.89        8.89 
          1 |      1,076       91.11      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,181      100.00 
4) State Code (Region Variable): VAR600010 
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NAME-STATE CODE COLUMNS 33 - 34 NUMERIC NO MISSING DATA CODES STATE AND COUNTY CODE 
 -- STATES all coded from ANES apendix 
Stata Dicotomous  
region_south 
          h |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        811       68.67       68.67 
          1 |        370       31.33      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,181      100.00 
Region_Midwest 
region_midw | 
        est |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        830       70.28       70.28 
          1 |        351       29.72      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,181      100.00 
4) Education Level : VAR 600128 
NAME-EDUCATION OF RESPONDENT COLUMNS 357 - 358 NUMERIC MD=GE 98 PD 10,10A,10B,10C. HOW 
MANY GRADES OF SCHOOL DID YOU FINISH. HAVE YOU HAD ANY SCHOOLING OTHER THAN HIGH SCHOOL. 
WHAT OTHER SCHOOLING HAVE YOU HAD. DO YOU HAVE A COLLEGE DEGREE. 
............................................................ SEE APPENDIX NOTE 24 00. NONE 4 11. 
 1 GRADE 8 12.  
2 GRADES 27 13.  
3 GRADES 35 14.  
4 GRADES 39 15.  
5 GRADES 77 16. 
 6 GRADES 75 17.  
7 GRADES 295 21. 
 8 GRADES 112 31.  
9 GRADES 110 32.  
10 GRADES 71 33.  
11 GRADES 10 41. 9  
GRADES PLUS NON-COLLEGE TRAINING 33 42. 10 
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 GRADES PLUS NON-COLLEGE TRAINING 35 43. 11 
 GRADES PLUS NON-COLLEGE TRAINING 382 51. 12 
 GRADES Page 70 nes1960.txt 184 61. 12 
 GRADES PLUS NON-COLLEGE TRAINING 234 71. SOME COLLEGE 151 81 
.COLLEGE DEGREE (4 YEARS COLLEGE) 43 82.  
ADVANCED COLLEGE DEGREE, COURSE WORK BEYOND BA OR BS 1 98. DK 4 99. NA 
 
 
 
 
 
*Stata Dichotomous  
 
  education |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        936       79.25       79.25 
          1 |        245       20.75      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,181      100.00 
 
Turnout: VAR600201 
NAME-WHM R VTED FR PRES COLUMNS 490 - 491 NUMERIC MD=GE 90 Q. 12, 13, 22. IN TALKING TO PEOPLE 
ABOUT THE ELECTION WE FIND THAT A LOT OF PEOPLE WEREN'T ABLE TO VOTE BECAUSE THEY WEREN'T 
REGISTERED OR THEY WERE SICK OR THEY JUST DIDN'T HAVE TIME. HOW ABOUT YOU, DID YOU VOTE THIS 
TIME. (IF YES) Q. 13. WHO DID YOU VOTE FOR FOR PRESIDENT. (IF NO) Q. 22. WHO WOULD YOU HAVE 
VOTED FOR FOR PRESIDENT IF YOU HAD VOTED. ...........................................................  
699 10. VOTED – DEMOCRATIC 
 722 20. VOTED – REPUBLICAN 
 7 30. VOTED - OTHER  
17 40. VOTED - REFUSED TO SAY FOR WHOM 0 
 50. VOTED - DK FOR WHOM  
0 60. VOTED - NA FOR WHOM  
167 70. NON-VOTER - DEMOCRATIC PREFERENCE  
162 80. NON-VOTER - REPUBLICAN PREFERENCE  
0 90. NON-VOTER - OTHER PREFERENCE  
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6 97. NON-VOTER - REFUSED TO STATE PREFERENCE  
47 98. NON-VOTER - DK PREFERENCE  
127 99. NON-VOTER - NA PREFERENCE, PRE-ELECTION INTERVIEW ONLY 
*Stata Dichotomous  
turnout_all | 
respondents |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        269       22.78       22.78 
          1 |        912       77.22      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      1,181      100.00 
ANES Survey Questions and Codes 2008: 
1b) Party Affiliation: Vo83098x 
 
-------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: R PARTY 
IDENTIFICATION ----------------------------------------------------------------- VALID 
CODES: ----------- 
 0. Strong Democrat (1;1;-1)  
1. Weak Democrat (1;5;-1)  
2. Independent-Democrat (3,4,5,-8;-1;5)  
3. Independent-Independent (3,4,5,-8;-1;3)  
4. Independent-Republican (3,4,5,-8;-1;1)  
5. Weak Republican (2;5;-1)  
6. Strong Republican (2;1;-1)  
MISSING CODES: ------------- -1. INAP, -9 in J1; -8,-9 in J1a; -8,-9 in J1b 
*Stata Dichotomous  
party_allre | 
  spondents |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,345       57.92       57.92 
          1 |        977       42.08      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,322      100.00 
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2b) Labor Union Membership Status: V083246 
Do you or anyone else in this household belong to a labor union? ---------------------------------------------------------
-------- VALID CODES: ----------- 
 1. Yes  
5. No 
 
*Stata Dichotomous  
      union |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      2,033       88.08       88.08 
          1 |        275       11.92      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,308      100.00 
 
3b) Race of Respondent:V083251a 
What racial or ethnic group or groups best describes you?  
10. Black  
20. Asian  
30. Native American  
40. Hispanic or Latino  
50. White 81.  
Other: recoded to Black 82.  
Other: recoded to Asian 83.  
Other: recoded to Native American 84.  
Other: recoded to Hispanic 85. 
 Other: recoded to White 90. Other: {SPECIFY} 
*Stata Dichotomous  
    race |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,139       49.05       49.05 
          1 |      1,183       50.95      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,322      100.00 
4b) Region Varaibles: V091207 
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Avaialbale in apendix E. 2008 ANES state and county master code 
 
 
 
 
 
*Stata Dichotomous 
i) Midwest 
region_Midwest 
 |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,925       82.90       82.90 
          1 |        397       17.10      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,322      100.00 
ii) South 
region_sout | 
          h |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,223       52.67       52.67 
          1 |      1,099       47.33      100.00 
------------+---------------------------- 
4b) Education: V083218x 
PRE-ELECTION SURVEY ----------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: R EDUCATIONAL 
ATTAINMENT -----------------------------------------------------------------  
0. DK/RF grades – 
1.  no HS diploma [-8,-9 in Y3 and 5 in Y3a]  
2. 1. 0-8 grades - no HS diploma/equivalency [0-8 in Y3 and 5 in Y3a]  
3. 2. 9-12 grades - no diploma/equivalency [9-12 in Y3 and 5 in Y3a]  
4. 3. 0-12 grades - HS diploma/equivalency [0-12 in Y3 and 1 in Y3a] 259  
5. 4. 13+ grades, no degree [0 in Y3b] 5. Junior or community college level degrees (AA degrees) [7 in Y3b]  
6. 6. BA level degrees [6 in Y3b] or 17+ grades with no advanced degree [17 in Y3 and 0 in Y3b]  
7. 7. Advanced degree (including LLB) [2-6 in Y3b] 
*Stata Dichotomous  
  education |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |      1,017       43.80       43.80 
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          1 |      1,305       56.20      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,322      100.00 
 
 
 
 
5b) Turnout:V085036x 
SUMMARY: R VOTE TURNOUT [OLD and NEW] 
====================================================================
========= POST-ELECTION SURVEY ----------------------------------------------------------------- SUMMARY: R 
VOTE TURNOUT ----------------------------------------------------------------- VALID CODES: -----------  
0. Did not vote in November 2008  
1. Voted in November 2008 
*Stata Dichotomous  
turnout_OLD | 
        NEW |      Freq.     Percent        Cum. 
------------+----------------------------------- 
          0 |        503       23.93       23.93 
          1 |      1,599       76.07      100.00 
------------+----------------------------------- 
      Total |      2,102      100.00 
